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Silicon photonics holds the promise of the miniaturization of quantum communication devices.
Recently, silicon chip optical transmitters for quantum key distribution (QKD) have been built
and demonstrated experimentally. Nonetheless, these silicon chips suffer substantial phase- and
polarization-dependent loss (PDL) which, if unchecked, could compromise the security of QKD
systems because of overestimating the secret key rate. Here, we first restore the security by regarding
the single photons without phase and polarization dependence as untagged and secure qubits. Next,
by using a post-selection technique, one could implement a secure QKD protocol that provides
a high key generation rate even in the presence of severe phase and polarization dependent loss.
Our solution is simple to realize in a practical experiment as it does not require any hardware
modification.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
parties, Alice and Bob, to share a common string of se-
cret data [1]. Based on the laws of quantum mechan-
ics, QKD offers unconditional security. Recently, secure
QKD has been experimentally demonstrated over 404 km
[2] of telecom fiber, based on the measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) pro-
tocol [3]. A quantum communication satellite has been
launched by China demonstrating satellite-based distri-
bution of entangled photon pairs over 1200 km [4]. In the
long term, quantum communication promises to offer se-
curity for both civilian and government applications. It
is widely believed that CMOS-compatible silicon photon-
ics holds the potential to dramatically lower the cost of
QKD devices, thus bringing QKD to widespread applica-
tions. Indeed, a seminal proof-of-principle QKD exper-
iment with a silicon photonic chip transmitter has been
recently implemented in [5]. More recently, a Bristol
group [6] has performed another QKD experiment also
with a silicon photonic chip transmitter. These two ex-
periments highlight the potential of silicon photonics in
quantum communication.
∗Electronic address: chenyangli@ece.utoronto.ca
†Electronic address: hklo@ece.utoronto.ca
The most common method of achieving fast modu-
lation in silicon devices so far is to exploit the plasma
dispersion effect [7], in which the concentration of free
charges in silicon changes both the real and imaginary
parts of the refractive index of the material, which affect
the phase and intensity of the propagating light simul-
taneously. On the other hand, an important assumption
in many security proofs of QKD is that the intensity of
a quantum signal is independent of the actual quantum
state encoded [8–11]. This is to avoid the existence of
side channel information that could allow Eve to learn
the photon polarization through an intensity measure-
ment. Unfortunately, this important assumption in the
security proofs of QKD cannot be guaranteed by current
silicon photonics modulators. For instance, in the Bristol
group’s silicon chip QKD transmitter [6], the magnitude
of the phase dependent loss was apparently measured to
be about 1 dB whereas the polarization dependent loss
was about 1.6 dB in the silicon chip transmitter demon-
strated in [5]. Polarization dependent loss is also an im-
portant issue when four separate lasers are used to imple-
ment the BB84 protocol. In satellite-based QKD, eight
laser diodes are integrated inside a single transmitter—
four for signal and four for decoy states, emitting photons
in a preset polarization state [12, 13]. A possible draw-
back of this approach is that the intensities of the light
pulses emitted from the diodes are not always identical.
Such polarization dependent loss, if unchecked, could re-
duce the secrete key rate and furthermore render a QKD
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2protocol insecure. In other words, if Alice and Bob are
unaware of the existence of the PDL, by overestimating
their key rate, they will generate a key that is too long
and is, therefore, not guaranteed to provide information-
theoretic security. The main goal of this paper is to re-
store the security of QKD in the presence of phase or
polarization dependent loss.
Generally speaking, our view is that there are two po-
tential methods to restore the security of QKD in the
presence of PDL. The first method is hardware based.
The sender, Alice, may add another intensity modulator
to compensate for PDL and ensure that the signal in-
tensity is independent of the actual polarization/phase
state. Such a method is theoretically simple, but may
add further complexity to an experiment by requiring
an additional component, which may in itself introduce
new imperfections. In this paper, we consider a second
method, which is software based. Our idea is to modify
the security proof and develop a software-based solution
to compensate for PDL. In particular, we will show how,
through post-selection of signals, we are able to restore
the security of decoy-state based QKD and maximize its
secret key generation rate.
In the bigger context, our work serves as an example
to demonstrate the power of software solutions in QKD
system designs and security analyses in the presence of
device imperfections.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II, we ex-
plain the physical origin of PDL in silicon chip QKD
transmitters. In Sec.III, we present a theoretical model
for the security analysis of decoy-state QKD with PDL.
In Sec.IV, we present a security proof for the QKD sys-
tem with PDL and we propose a post-selection scheme
to maximize the key generation rate. In Sec.V, we per-
form a numerical optimization to maximize the secret
key rate by considering the asymptotic case where Alice
sends Bob an infinite number of signals. In Sec.VI, we
introduce a technique to apply the refined data analysis
to the QKD system. In Sec.VII, we analyze the finite key
reginme in QKD and show that our results are robust in
the practical setting of an experiment with a finite data
size. Finally, in Sec.VIII, we provide some concluding
remarks.
II. PHASE/POLARIZATION DEPENDENT
LOSS
Let us first review the physical origin of PDL in a sili-
con photonics transmitter for QKD. The plasma disper-
sion effect is widely used to achieve fast modulation in
silicon devices. Injection or depletion of free carriers in
silicon changes the real and imaginary parts of the refrac-
tive index of the material, which then change the phase
and absorption of the propagating light. Soref and Ben-
nett [14] experimentally quantified the refractive index
change over a wide range of electron and hole densities.
For instance, at a wavelength of 1.55µm the changes in
the real part 4n of the refractive index and in the ab-
sorption coefficient4α over the carrier densities in silicon
can be expressed as:
4n=−[8.8×10−22×4Ne+8.5×10−18×4N0.8h ],
4α=8.5×10−18×4Ne+6.0×10−18×4Nh, (1)
where 4Ne and 4Nh are, respectively, the changes in
the free electron density and free hole density.
As already mentioned above, the overall PDL in the
QKD silicon photonic transmitter implemented in [5] was
found to be around 1.6 dB. Similarly, the Bristol group
[6] found that PDL provides stringent restrictions for
high speed modulators, like carrier-injection or carrier-
depletion modulators. In their experiment, PDL was
found to be about 1 dB. In summary, PDL was non-
negligible in both experimental demonstrations. Note
that in [5, 6], the authors considered PDL in the silicon
chip only, and ignored PDL in other fiber components.
This is reasonable because, for instance, according to [15],
the typical PDL in a single-mode fiber channel at 10 km
is less than 0.05 dB, which is negligible. We have also
performed a simple measurement of PDL in a fiber-based
polarization encoding QKD source. The schematic set-
up is shown in Fig.1. The output power of the system
is measured for different polarization states, which are
created by sweeping the voltage applied to the polariza-
tion modulator. As shown in Fig.1, the ratio between the
maximum and minimum power was found to be around
0.2 dB, which is rather small. In the next section, we dis-
cuss how the existence of PDL in the state preparation
process of QKD could affect its security.
III. MODEL
To better understand how PDL affects the security of
QKD, we first present a mathematical model that de-
scribes the typical behaviour of the different elements of
a QKD system. In particular, we model the source, chan-
nel, detector, yield and quantum bit error rate in decoy-
state QKD. After that, we explain how PDL affects the
security analysis of QKD.
A. State preparation
Here, a strongly attenuated laser pulse is modeled as a
weak coherent state. For concreteness, below we shall fo-
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FIG. 1: (a) Schematic of the QKD source used for the PDL
measurement. A CW laser is attenuated using a variable op-
tical attenuator (VOA). The setup further consists of a phase
modulator (PM) for phase randomization and an intensity
modulator (IM) to generate pulses. The polarization of the
weak coherent pulses is modulated by a polarization modula-
tor (PolM) which is based on a structure proposed in [16]
using a Faraday Mirror (FM). Two electronic polarization
controllers (EPCs) are included in the source for polarization
alignment. (b) The variation of power at the output of the
source with respect to the voltage applied to the phase modu-
lator in the polarization modulator. The maximum variation
of the output power for different polarization states is around
0.2 dB.
cus on polarization encoding, but similar arguments can
be applied to phase encoding as well. Since the intensity
of a pulse may now depend on its polarization, we denote
the expected photon numbers of the signal states for hor-
izontal, vertical, diagonal (45-degrees), and antidiagonal
(135-degrees) polarizations by µs,H , µs,V , µs,D and µs,A
respectively. Assuming that the phase of each pulse is
totally randomized, the density matrix which describes
the state emitted by Alice is given by [11, 17]:
ρs,M=
∑
i
µis,M
i!
e−µs,M |i〉〈i|M , (2)
where M represents one of the four polarizations with
M∈{H,V,D,A}. Note that such a phase randomized
weak coherent pulse is a mixture of Fock states whose
photon number is Poissonian distributed with mean
µs,M .
For simplicity and for the moment we shall assume that
PDL only occurs in the horizontal and diagonal polariza-
tions. This means that:
µs,V =µs,A=µs, (3)
where µs is the original intensity selected by Alice. Also,
for simplicity, we shall consider the special case where
the same PDL occurs in the two bases:
µs,H=L×µs,V ,
µs,D=L×µs,A, (4)
where L is the loss coefficient and has the form L=
10−PDL/10 with the parameter PDL measured in dB.
Note, however, that the method that we present later
on to achieve secure QKD in the presence of PDL is
rather general and does not rely on the assumptions given
by Eqs. (3)-(4).
B. Transmission and detection efficiency
For a fiber-based channel, the transmittance ηchannel
can be expressed as [11, 17]:
ηchannel=10
−αd/10, (5)
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel mea-
sured in dB/km, and d is the transmission distance mea-
sured in km. The overall transmission and detection ef-
ficiency between Alice and Bob, ηsys, can be written as:
ηsys=ηchannelηBob, (6)
where ηBob denotes the overall transmittance of Bob’s de-
tection apparatus, which includes the detection efficiency
of his detectors.
C. Yield and quantum bit error rate
Since now the intensity of the signal state depends
on the polarization, we apply a refined data analysis
scheme to analyze the parameters for different polariza-
tions. Thus, we define Yi to be the yield of an i-photon
state (i.e., the probability to observe a detection click
at Bob’s side), and Yi,M with M∈{H,V,D,A} to be the
yield of an i-photon state prepared in the given polariza-
tion. Note that in a single mode fiber without PDL, we
assume:
Yi=Yi,H=Yi,V =Yi,D=Yi,A. (7)
4The yield of an i-photon state originates from two main
contributions: the background rate Y0 and the signal
states. For a typical channel model, the yields Yi can
be expressed as [11, 17].
Yi=1−(1−Y0)(1−ηsys)i. (8)
The gains for different polarizations (i.e., the overall
probabilities to observe a detection click at Bob’s side)
are given by:
Qs,M=
∑
i
µis,M
i!
e−µs,MYi,M=1−(1−Y0,M )e−µs,Mηsys ,
(9)
where M∈{H,V,D,A}. Note that the value of the differ-
ent gains is directly experimentally observed in a QKD
run.
Then, we define ei to be the error rate of an i-photon
state, and ei,M with M∈{H,V,D,A} to be the error rate
of an i-photon state prepared in the given polarization.
For simplicity, in a single mode fiber without PDL we
also assume:
ei=ei,H=ei,V =ei,D=ei,A. (10)
For a typical channel model, the i-photon error rate ei is
given by [10, 11]:
ei=
Y0e0+(Yi−Y0)ed
Yi
, (11)
where ed is the probability that a signal hits an erro-
neous detector due to the misalignment in the quantum
channel. For simplicity, we assume that ed is indepen-
dent of the distance and e0=1/2 (i.e., we consider that
the background is random).
The overall quantum bit error rates (QBERs), Es,M
with M∈{H,V,D,A}, for different polarizations are given
by:
Es,M=
1
Qs,M
∑
i
µis,M
i!
e−µs,MYi,Mei,M
=
1
Qs,M
(Y0,M (e0,M−ed)+ed[1−(1−Y0,M )e−µs,M,ηsys ]),
(12)
The value of the different QBERs given by Eq.(12) is also
directly experimentally observed in a QKD run.
Note that the assumption about polarization indepen-
dence of the quantum channel, as described in Eqs.(7)
and (10), is used to simplify our numerical simulations
and discussions. However, the security analysis that we
present later on is general and does not require such an
assumption.
IV. SECURITY PROOF AND
POST-SELECTION SCHEME
A. General security proof for QKD with PDL
In this section, we restore the security of decoy-state
QKD in the presence of PDL at the source. But before
we do so, let us first consider the secret key rate of the
decoy-state BB84 protocol without PDL. Based on the
security analysis presented in [10, 11], which combines
the idea of the entanglement distillation approach by
Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill in [18] with the decoy
state method, the secret key rate formula, in the asymp-
totic limit of infinitely many quantum transmission data,
can be written as:
R≥q{Q1[1−H(e1,phase)]−Qsf(Es)H(Es)}, (13)
where q is the efficiency of the procotol (q=1/2 for the
standard BB84 protocol [19], and q≈1 for its efficient
version [20]), Qs is the gain of the signal states, Es is
the overall quantum bit error rate of the signal states,
Q1 is the gain of the single-photon states, e1,phase is
the phase error rate of the single-photon states, f(Es)
is the efficiency of the error correction protocol, and
H(x)=−xlog2(x)−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shan-
non entropy function.
In the presence of PDL, now the intensity of the sig-
nal states depends on their actual polarization. That is,
given a signal state, the probability that it is a single
photon state now depends on its polarization. This vi-
olates a fundamental assumption in the security proof
of QKD—that the density matrices of the single-photon
components should be maximally mixed. i.e., the single-
photon components should be equally likely to be in the
state associated to a bit value zero and to a bit value one.
For this reason, the secret key rate stated in Eq.(13) is
not valid.
One simple way to recover a valid secret key rate in
the presence of PDL is to replace Q1 by the gain of
those single photons with a random choice of polariza-
tion. In other words, the secret key is only generated
from the single-photon components whose density matri-
ces are maximally mixed. Then one obtains:
Q1−→min{µs,He−µs,H , µs,V e−µs,V }×Y1, (14)
Y1−→Y1,H+Y1,V
2
,
e1,phase−→Y1,De1,D+Y1,Ae1,A
Y1,D+Y1,A
,
Qs−→1
2
Qs,H+
1
2
Qs,V ,
QsEs−→1
2
Qs,HEs,H+
1
2
Qs,V Es,V .
5Note that the gains and QBERs, Qs,H , Qs,V , Es,H , Es,V ,
can be experimentally obtained from a QKD run. The
phase error, e1,phase, of the single-photon components
whose density matrices are maximally mixed can be es-
timated as an average QBER of the single-photon states
in the X basis (diagonal and antidiagonal polarizations).
Also, the yield of the single-photon components, Y1, the
gain of the signal, Qs, and the QBERs, Es, can be esti-
mated as an average in the Z basis (horizontal and ver-
tical polarizations).
The main idea of this security proof is that, if there are
more vertically polarized single photons than horizontally
polarized single photons in the source, those excess pho-
tons are simply discarded and make no contribution to
the secret key. Besides, we still need to correct the er-
rors caused by those excess signals. This method works
well if the PDL is small. When PDL is too large, the
error corrections is very inefficient, so we introduce the
post-selection scheme to solve this problem in the next
section.
B. Post-selection scheme for QKD with large PDL
To obtain a higher secret key rate in the presence of
large PDL, we now introduce a post-selection scheme. As
already mentioned above (see Eq.(4)), for simplicity let
us consider that the PDL occurs in the horizontal polar-
ization. In this scenario, we want to keep the data from
the horizontal polarization because they are fewer and
thus precious to us. For the vertical polarization, we ran-
domly keep or discard a portion of the signals to balance
out its number with that of the horizontally polarized
signals. For instance, this can be done by introducing a
post-selection probability P such that for each vertically
polarized signal sent by Alice, she keeps it with probabil-
ity P and discards it with probability 1−P . Once Bob
has measured all the incoming signals, Alice informs him
which signals are kept and which ones are discarded. By
using such broadcast information, Alice and Bob can sim-
ply discard all the excess signals. This means that they
no longer need to correct the bit errors in these excess
signals. Therefore, they save the cost of error correction.
This allows them to obtain a higher secret key rate over
longer distances than what they would otherwise have ob-
tained. More concretely, with the post-selection scheme,
we have that:
Q˜1−→min{µs,He−µs,H , P×µs,V e−µs,V }×Y1, (15)
Y1−→Y1,H+Y1,V
2
,
e1,phase−→Y1,De1,D+Y1,Ae1,A
Y1,D+Y1,A
,
Q˜s−→1
2
Qs,H+P×1
2
Qs,V ,
Q˜sE˜s−→1
2
Qs,HEs,H+P×1
2
Qs,V Es,V .
Note that the e1,phase and Y1 are not modified, because
one always requires that the density matrices of the
single-photon components are maximally mixed. If P=1,
it means that we do not apply post-selection and keep all
data. With the post-selection scheme, the secret key rate
can be expressed as:
R≥q{Q˜1[1−H(e1,phase)]−Q˜sf(E˜s)H(E˜s)}. (16)
A key advantage of this approach is moreover that the
post-selection can be done as a software solution. In par-
ticular, there is no need to modify the hardware of the
quantum transmission in a QKD system. Since QKD
hardware is typically more expensive than software and
more difficult to modify, such a software solution is often
preferred over a hardware solution.
C. Optimal P and µs
The next question is: what is the optimal value of the
post-selection probability P? To answer this question,
here we discuss about how to optimize the secret key rate
by choosing a post-selection probability. Heuristically,
since the goal of the post-selection scheme is to discard
the excess signals, one would expect that after the post-
selection, for the single-photon components, there is an
equal probability that they are vertically or horizontally
polarized. This means that we theoretically expect that
the value of P satisfies the following equations:
µs,He
−µs,H=P×µs,V e−µs,V ,
µs,H=Lµs,V , (17)
from which we obtain:
Poptimal=
Le−Lµs,V
eµs,V
. (18)
If we consider the case where the background rate is
low (Y0<<ηsys) and the transmittance is small (ηsys<<
1), then with the Poptimal and the channel model de-
scribed in the previous section, the key rate is given by
60 2 4 6 8 10
PDL (dB)
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Op
tim
al 
 s
FIG. 2: By numerical simulation, we obtain the optimal value
of µs that satisfies Eq.(20). When PDL increases, the optimal
µs increases as well in order to generate more single photons.
The experimental parameters are given in Table I.
TABLE I: Experimental parameters for QKD on chip [5]
ed Y0 ηBob α(dB/km)
0.015 2×10−5 0.2 0.2
[11]:
R≈−
(
1
2
Poptimalηsysµs+
1
2
ηsysLµs
)
f(ed)H(ed)
+ηsysLµse
−Lµs(1−H(ed)). (19)
In this case, it can be shown that the rate is maximized
if we choose a µs which satisfies:
[1−H2(ed)][Le−Lµs−L2µse−Lµs ]=
1
2
f(ed)H2(ed)[L+Le
(1−L)µs+Lµse(1−L)µs(1−L)]. (20)
By using the experimental parameters shown in Table I,
we find that when PDL increases, µs increases as shown
in Fig.2. We should note that when the value of PDL
is larger than 4 dB, the optimal µs may exceed 1. In
the QKD scenario without PDL [10, 11], the optimal µs
always lies within the range of 0 and 1. In the next
section, we numerically search the optimal values of P
and µs. Our numerical simulation shows that our above
heuristical argument is essentially correct.
V. INFINITE DECOY STATES AND INFINITE
DATA SIZES
In this section, for simplicity, we consider the asymp-
totic case where Alice uses an infinite number of decoy
states and an infinite number of transmission data are
available for each type of decoy state.
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FIG. 3: Figures (a) shows the optimal values of µs that
maximize the secret key rate according to our numerical sim-
ulations. Figures (b) shows the optimal values of P . The
value of PDL increases from 0 dB to 10 dB (from top to bot-
tom). Figure (c) shows the deviation between the numerically
optimal value of P and the theoretical optimal value, Poptimal,
obtained from Eq.(18). As the deviation is rather small, this
verifies the validity of our heuristic argument.
The goal is to numerically evaluate the resulting secret
key rate when one selects the optimal values for the signal
intensity and the post-selection probability. With infinite
decoy states and data sizes [11], it is possible to esti-
mate the values of Y1 and e1,phase, phase precisely. This
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FIG. 4: Comparison between (a) a QKD system with post-
selection scheme (P=Poptimal, µs=µs,optimal) and (b) a QKD
system without post-selection scheme (P=1, µs=µ
′
s,optimal).
The secret key rate can be largely increased if the system
suffers large PDL. The value of PDL increases from 0 dB to
10 dB (from top to bottom) for all figures.
means that for the channel model introduced above, we
have that the lower bound on the single-photon yield is
approximately Y L1 =1−(1−Y0)(1−ηsys). Also, the upper
bound on the single-photon phase error rate is approxi-
mately eU1,phase=(Y0e0+(Y1−Y0)ed)/Y1. By substituting
the values of Y L1 and e
U
1,phase into Eq.(16) and using pa-
rameters from Table I, the secret key rate becomes a
function of P and µs, that is: R=f(P,µs). Next, we nu-
merically optimize the secret key R over the free param-
eters P and µs. The results are shown in Fig.3. Figures
3 (a) and (b) show the numerical optimization results
for the intensity and post-selection probability. As men-
tioned before, the optimal µs may exceed 1 to generate
more single photons due to large PDL. The optimal value
of P decreases when PDL increases, since more signals
need to be discarded. Figure 3 (c) shows the deviation
between the optimal value of P obtained numerically and
the theoretical value Poptimal obtained by our heuristic
argument from Eq.(18). These results indicate that the
optimal value of P obtained numerically matches its the-
oretical value Poptimal, thus verifying the validity of our
heuristic argument in Sec.IV.
Next in Fig.4, we compare the secret key rate of a QKD
system with the post-selection scheme (P=Poptimal) and
that without the post-selection scheme (P=1). Our
method without post-selection still works well in terms
of small PDL. When we apply the post-selection scheme,
the secret key rate can be largely increased when the
source suffers large PDL. The secret key rate comparison
results are summarized in Table II at the distance of 80
km. When the value of PDL is as small as 1.6 dB, we
find that the secret key rate can be improved by 3.28%
if the post-selection scheme is adopted. If the value of
PDL increases, then the advantage of the post-selection
scheme is more notorious. This demonstrates clearly the
benefits of using post-selection scheme.
VI. REFINED DATA ANALYSIS FOR FINITE
DECOY STATES WITH INFINITE DATA SIZES
In the previous section, our discussion was restricted
to the case where Alice uses an infinite number of decoy
states. In contrast, in this section, we consider the case
where the number of decoy states is finite. For instance,
in a standard two-decoy state protocol, only two decoy
states are used (in addition to the signal state). The two-
decoy method used to calculate the quantities, Y L1 , and
eU1,phase, is described in detail in [11, 17]. (Eg. see Eqs.
(21) and (25) in [11].)
As before, we apply a refined data analysis. Now, for
each polarization, we apply the two-decoy method to an-
alyze the channel. As depicted in table III, by separat-
ing the data from different polarizations, we now have
twelve observables: {Qn,M ,En,M}, where n∈{s,v,w} de-
notes the intensity setting selected from the signal states
(s) , the decoy states (v) and the vacuum states (w), and
M∈{H,V,D,A}. Now we are able to estimate a lower
bound on the single-photon yields for different polariza-
tions based on the specific intensities. Moreover, note
that for this it is not necessary to use the assumptions
given by Eqs. (3)-(4)-(7)-(10) but our approach is gen-
eral.
Based on the secret key rate formula given by Eq.(16),
we need to estimate a lower bound on Y1 and an upper
bound on e1,phase. By using the refined data analysis, we
8TABLE II: Key rate comparison at 80 km
PDL(dB) 0 1.6 3 5 10
key rate with the post-selection scheme 10−3.61 10−3.643 10−3.688 10−3.784 10−4.168
key rate without the post-selection scheme 10−3.61 10−3.657 10−3.718 10−3.859 0
percentage increase 0% 3.28% 7.15% 18.9% infinity
TABLE III: Refined data analysis scheme
Polarization Input Output
H Qs,H ,Es,H Qv,H ,Ev,H Qw,H ,Ew,H Y
L
0,H Y
L
1,H
V Qs,V ,Es,V Qv,V ,Ev,V Qw,V ,Ew,V Y
L
0,V Y
L
1,V
D Qs,D,Es,D Qv,D,Ev,D Qw,D,Ew,D Y
L
0,D Y
L
1,D (Y1,De1,D)
U
A Qs,A,Es,A Qv,A,Ev,A Qw,A,Ew,A Y
L
0,A Y
L
1,A (Y1,Ae1,A)
U
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FIG. 5: The deviation of Y1 is proportional to the intensity of
the decoy states. Large PDL values lead to large deviations.
The value of PDL increases from 0 dB to 10 dB (from bottom
to top).
have:
Y L1 =
Y L1,H+Y
L
1,V
2
, (21)
eU1,phase=
(Y1,De1,D)
U+(Y1,Ae1,A)
U
Y L1,D+Y
L
1,A
.
First, we show the estimated values of Y L1 when the
source suffers different PDLs. For illustrative purposes,
we consider Y1=Y0+ηsys to be the actual experimen-
tal value(i.e., we consider that the term Y0∗ηsys is ne-
glectable). Therefore, the relative deviation is given by:
βY1=
Y1−Y L1
Y1
. (22)
Moreover, we also use the experimental parameters for
the QKD chip shown in Table I and change the inten-
sity of the weak decoy state to see how it affects our
estimation. As shown in Fig.5, the deviation of Y1 is
proportional to the intensity of the weak decoy state in
the case of infinite data sizes and the trend of the de-
viation follows the PDL. That is, when the PDL at the
source increases, the deviations becomes larger. This is
expected since a larger deviation corresponds to a smaller
secret key rate.
Next, we consider the secret key rate. For this, we
numerically optimize the secret key rate over the free
parameters {µs, µv}. By computing Y L1 and eU1,phase
and substituting their values in Eq.(16), we obtain the
final result of the secret key rate. As depicted in Fig.6,
the two-decoy state method works well compared to the
asymptotic case described in Sec.V.
VII. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATIONS FOR
FINITE DATA SIZES
In this section, we first define the security criteria that
we use [21, 22]. For some small errors, εcor, εsec>0,
we say that a QKD protocol is εcor + εsec secure if
it is εcor correct and εsec secret. The former is satis-
fied if Alice’s and Bob’s secret keys are identical except
with a small probability εcor. The latter is satisfied if
||ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE ||1/2 ≤ εsec, where ρAE is the classical-
quantum state describing the joint state of SA and E,
and UA is the uniform mixture of all possible values of
SA, where SA is the secret key of Alice and E denotes
Eve’s quantum system. Importantly, this secrecy crite-
rion guarantees that the protocol is universally compos-
able, i.e., the pair of secret keys can be safely used in
any cryptographic task. Conditioned on passing the tests
in the error-estimation and error-verification steps, the
length of the εcor + εsec secure key in the Z basis is given
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FIG. 6: Here, we consider the two-decoy state method (de-
coy+vaccum) with µw=0 and numerically optimize the secret
key rate over the free parameters, µs and µv. Also, we use
the optimal value of P given by Eq. (18). (a) We estimate
the secret key rate with different PDL values. The value of
PDL increases from 0 dB to 10 dB (from top to bottom). (b)
We compare the two-decoy state method (bottom) with the
asymptotic case (top) described in Fig.4 (a). The value of
PDL is 10 dB. The two-decoy state method works well, since
the resulting secret key rate is close to the asymptotic case.
by [21, 22]:
l ≥ sLz,s,1[1−h(eUx,1)]− λEC (23)
− 6 log2
21
εsec
− log2
2
εcor
,
where sLz,s,1 is a lower bound on the number of single-
photon events for signal states in the Z basis that con-
tribute to the sifted key, and eUx,1 is an upper bound on
the single-photon phase error rate estimated from the X
basis events. λEC is the syndrome information declared
for error correction. With l, the secret key rate is given
by Rl = l/N with N denoting the total number of signals
(optical pulses) sent by Alice.
For a QKD system with a two-decoy state method (de-
coy+vaccum), let the symbols Ns, Nvand Nw denote the
number of pulses sent by Alice in the three intensities.
Then the total number of pulses sent by Alice is given
by:
N=Ns+Nv+Nw. (24)
The probability to choose the intensity setting n∈{s,v,w}
is then given by Pn=Nn/N . Alice and Bob both use
the Z basis for key generation and the X basis to esti-
mate the phase error rate. The basis choice probability
is set for simplicity to be PX=PZ=1/2. The polariza-
tion choice probability is PM=1/2 for each basis, where
M∈{H,V,D,A}. The number of pulses for different polar-
ization, Nn,M , is given by: Nn,M=Nn/4. Here, we recall
that we apply the post-selection scheme for the signal
state in the Z basis, i.e., vertical polarization. Thus, we
can pre-choose a random data size, Ns,V =P×Ns/4, to
keep this data while we discard other data in the ver-
tical polarization. In fact, the signal state intensity is
typically used much more frequently than the two de-
coy state intensities, so the statistical fluctuations are
still small after considering the post-selection data size
effect. Then the number of single-photon events from sig-
nal states has the form: sLz,s,1=Q
L
1,s,HNs,H+Q
L
1,s,VNs,V ,
where QL1,s,HNs,H and Q
L
1,s,VNs,V are, respectively, the
lower bounds on the number of single-photon events in
horizontal and vertical polarizations which are detected
by Bob.
Based on the table III, we have 12 experimental ob-
servables: Qn,MNn,M and Qn,MEn,MNn,M . For a finite
data size, due to Hoeffding’s inequality [22, 23], the ex-
perimental values Qn,MNn,M , Qn,MEn,MNn,M and the
expected values Q¯n,MNn,M , Q¯n,M E¯n,MNn,M satisfy:
|Qn,MNn,M−Q¯n,MNn,M |≤∆(QMNM ,εsec),
|Qn,MEn,MNn,M−Q¯n,M E¯n,MNn,M |≤∆(QMEMNM ,εsec),
(25)
with probability at least 1−2εsec , where QMNM and
QMEMNM , respectively, denote all detection events and
errors in the M polarization, with M∈{H,V,D,A}, and
∆(x, ε):=
√
x/2ln(1/ε). Note that, compared to the stan-
dard error analysis presented in [11], the analysis intro-
duced in [22] considers general attacks.
For the evaluation, we use the chip-based QKD param-
eters shown in Table I and fix εcor = εsec = 10
−10. We
pick the total data size to be between N=1010 and 1014.
We numerically optimize the secret key rate Rl over the
free parameters {µs, µv, Ps, Pv}. The optimization re-
sult is depicted in Fig.7. In terms of the secret key rate,
it is advantageous to select a larger data size, since a
smaller data size corresponds to larger statistical fluctu-
ations. Besides, the secret key rate is approaching the
10
asymptotic case when the data size increases. Even in
the presence of a PDL as high as 10 dB and a data size
of 1010, the maximum distance is about 100 km. This
suggests the effectiveness of our post-selection scheme.
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FIG. 7: Simulation result of the finite data size effect. We
select the total number of pulses to be between N=1010 and
1014 (from left to right). The value of PDL is 10 dB. As
expected, the secret key rate is approaching the asymptotic
case if we increase the data size.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the security of QKD in the pres-
ence of PDL. The secure key rate of QKD system will
be reduced due to a polarization dependence loss in the
source. Because of the overestimation of the key rate,
Alice and Bob will generate a key that is not guaranteed
to provide information-theoretic security. Here, we first
restore the security by generating the key from the single-
photon components whose density matrices are maxi-
mamlly mixed. In [18], the single photons which are ba-
sis independent are regarded to be untagged and secure
qubits. Our security proof follows this idea and regards
the single photons without polarization dependence in
the source as untagged and secure qubits. Next, when
there is a large PDL in the system, the maximum trans-
mission distance becomes rather short, as the imbalance
of the single photon portion may leak more information
to Eve. Trying to balance the single photon portion in the
encoding basis, we have proposed a post-selection scheme
that discards the signals in a polarization with a smaller
PDL or without PDL. Given the post-selection scheme
and refined data analysis, we have numerically optimized
the intensity settings and the post-selection probability.
Finally, we have studied the decoy state method and the
finite data size effect. The two-decoy state method works
well in our scheme. By increasing the total data size, one
can achieve the asymptotic secret key rate. In summary,
our work provides a simple software solution that com-
pensates for PDL in silicon photonics QKD, thus paving
the way to low-cost high-speed QKD transmitters based
on silicon photonics.
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